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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Laws are like cobwebs that entangle the weak, but are broken by the 
strong.” 
Anarcharsis, Ancient Greek Philosopher1 
 
On April 23, 1987, the New Jersey Legislature unanimously 
adopted the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (“CDRA”) of 1987.2  
The statute,3 enacted in response to the state’s increasing drug 
problems,4 wages war against drugs in New Jersey on a number of 
fronts.5  The CDRA ensures stringent, consistent punishment for all 
drug offenders, both users and dealers;6 it provides incentive7 and 
 
 ∗ J.D. 2004, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2001, The College of New 
Jersey. 
 1 Quotes on Good and Evil and Power and Truth, at http://www.math.usf.edu-
mccol/Equotes.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004). 
 2 W. Cary Edwards, An Overview of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, 13 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 5, 6 (1989). 
 3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004). 
 4 Edwards, supra note 2, at 8.  In 1986, there was a record 40,690 drug arrests in 
New Jersey, making approximately 50% of all crime in New Jersey drug related.  See 
also DEA Briefs and Background, Drugs and Drug Abuse, State Fact Sheets, New 
Jersey (Mar. 25, 2002) (noting that New Jersey is an attractive transportation site for 
drug gangs based on its international airport, proximity to New York City, and its 
numerous major commercial shipping centers and further noting that in urban 
areas, such as Elizabeth, Newark, Trenton and Camden, there continues to be 
widespread crack, heroin and cocaine abuse), available  at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newjersey.html; see also N.J. STAT. ANN.            
§ 2C:35-1.1(b) (West 2004) (noting in its legislative findings that, “the unlawful use, 
manufacture, and distribution of controlled dangerous substances continues to pose 
a serious and pervasive threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this 
state”). 
 5 Edwards, supra note 2, at 6. 
 6 Id. 
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encouragement8 for the state’s youth to avoid the dangers of drugs;9 it 
attempts to reduce the drug supply in the state of New Jersey by 
providing police, prosecutors, and courts with the tools necessary to 
wage a successful attack against drug traffickers and dealers;10 and 
finally, through education, the CDRA attempts to reduce the demand 
for drugs in the state.11 
New Jersey’s strict liability for drug-induced death statute, 2C:35-
9,12 was enacted as part of the CDRA in 1987.13  Under this statute, a 
 
 7 Id. (noting that in some circumstances the CDRA requires mandatory 
suspension or postponement of driving privileges upon conviction of a drug related 
offense and stating that the statute mandates the imposition of cash penalties for all 
drug convictions). 
 8 Id. (quoting former New Jersey Attorney General W. Cary Edwards, “it [CDRA] 
creates drug ‘safety zones’ around school yards in recognition of the paramount 
responsibility of the school to educate our youth . . . [and] mandates the imposition 
of stiff cash penalties for all drug convictions, and the use of these funds to increase 
educational preventive and treatment programs throughout the state”). 
 9 National Drug Intelligence Center, New Jersey Drug Threat Assessment (May 15, 
2001) (noting that in 1999 there were 144 cocaine overdoses that resulted in death 
in Newark.  Of 23 U.S. cities surveyed in 1999, Newark had the highest mean heroin 
purity levels, 67.5%), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/669/cocaine.html; see also NBC News.com, Gangs 
Take Root in the Garden State, (Nov. 7, 2002) (reporting that the increase of violent 
crimes in New Jersey is directly correlated with the “super-gangs” that have followed 
the drug trade east and further noting that a survey of New Jersey police departments 
has linked one in five murders to drug related gang activity), 
available at http://www.wnbc.com/news/1771216/detail.html. 
 10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004): 
[I]n order to be effective, the battle against drugs must be waged 
aggressively at every level along the drug distribution chain, but in 
particular, our criminal laws must target for expedited prosecution and 
enhanced punishment those repeat drug offenders and upper echelon 
members of the organized narcotics trafficking networks who pose the 
greatest danger to society. 
 11 Edwards, supra note 2, at 7. 
 12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004). The statute provides in pertinent part: 
a. Any person who manufactures, distributes, or dispenses any 
controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedules I or II 
(including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, lysergic acid 
diethylamide, phencyclidine, or any analog thereof) is strictly liable for 
a death which results from the ingestion, injection, or inhalation of 
that substance and is guilty of a crime of the first degree. 
b. For purposes of this offense, to distribute means the transfer, actual 
or constructive, or attempted, from one person to another. N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:35-2 (West 2004). 
c. For purposes of this offense manufacture means the production, 
preparation, propagation compounding, conversion or processing of 
[insert appropriate substance] either directly or by extraction from 
substances of natural origin. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-2 (West 2004). 
d. The defendants act of manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, a 
substance is the cause of death when: 
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person may be held strictly liable for drug-induced death, a first 
degree crime punishable by ten to twenty years in prison,14 if she 
manufactured, sold, or otherwise provided a person with drugs, if 
that person subsequently dies as a result of ingestion, inhalation, or 
injection of those drugs.15  The New Jersey legislature included this 
powerful strict liability provision as a way to trace liability back to the 
“upper echelon” drug dealers or “kingpins” of the organized drug 
trade.16  The statute explicitly states, 
 
(1) The injection, inhalation or ingestion of the substance is an 
antecedent but for which the death would not have occurred; 
and  
(2) The death was not: 
(a) too remote in its occurrence as to have a just bearing on 
the defendant’s liability; or 
(b) too dependent upon conduct of another person which 
was unrelated to the injection, inhalation or ingestion of 
the substance or its effect as to have a just bearing on the 
defendant’s liability. 
e. It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the 
decedent contributed to his own death by his purposeful, knowing, 
reckless or negligent injection, inhalation or ingestion of the 
substance, or by his consenting to the administration of the substance 
by another. 
 13 Id. 
 14 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 2004).  In State v. Cullum, 338 N.J. 
Super. 458, 769 A.2d 1091 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), the court found that drug-
induced death was a “violent crime” under the provisions of the No Early Release Act 
(NERA), which requires individuals convicted of a violent crime to serve eighty-five 
percent of their sentence before being eligible for parole.  Id. at 464, 769 A.2d at 
1095.  The court defined violent crime under NERA to include any crime that causes 
death.  Id.  In this case, the defendant provided heroin to a person who overdosed 
and died a few minutes after injection.  Id. at 460, 769 A.2d at 1092.  The court found 
that the defendant caused the death of the decedent when he distributed the heroin 
to him and therefore was subject to the provisions of NERA.  Id. at 464, 769 A.2d at 
1095 (emphasis added).  Furthermore, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-14 (West 2004) 
makes a person convicted of drug-induced death ineligible for drug dependant 
persons treatment.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 35-15(a)(1) (West 2004) imposes a 
mandatory penalty of three thousand dollars.  Finally, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 35-16 
(West 2004) imposes a mandatory suspension of driving privileges for a period of no 
less than 6 months. 
 15 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9. 
 16 Upon enactment of the drug-induced death statute, the New Jersey legislature 
declared it the public policy of the state that 
“[I]n particular our criminal laws must target for expedited 
prosecution and enhanced punishment those repeat drug offenders 
and upper echelon members of organized narcotics trafficking networks 
who pose the greatest danger to society.  In order to ensure the most 
efficient and effective dedication of limited investigative, prosecutorial, 
judicial and correctional resources, it is the policy of this State to 
distinguish between drug offenders based on the seriousness of the 
offense, considering principally the nature, quality and purity of the 
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[the statute] must target for expedited prosecution and enhanced 
punishment those repeat drug offenders and upper echelon 
members of organized narcotics trafficking networks who pose 
the greatest danger to society. In order to ensure the most 
efficient and effective dedication of limited investigative, 
prosecutorial, judicial and correctional resources, it is the policy 
of this State to distinguish between drug offenders based on the 
seriousness of the offense, considering principally the nature, 
quality and purity of the controlled substance and the role of the 
actor in the overall drug distribution network. It is the intention 
of the legislature to provide for the strict punishment, deterrence 
and incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous drug 
offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug dependent 
persons.17 
As the aforementioned statutory language should make clear, 
the legislature envisioned the statute as a way to cripple the organized 
drug trade by giving prosecutors the power to attack upper echelon 
drug dealers, who oftentimes have no interaction with their buyers 
and are therefore virtually immune to homicide prosecution.18  Based 
on the strict liability19 provision of the New Jersey statute, the 
prosecutor can gain a conviction without ever proving the mens rea,20 
or requisite mental state, normally required for conviction.21  The 
 
controlled substance and the role of the actor in the overall drug 
distribution network.  It is the intention of the legislature to provide for the 
strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most culpable and 
dangerous drug offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug dependent 
persons. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 The strict liability feature of the New Jersey statute allows the prosecutor to 
carry the burden of persuasion and gain a conviction without proving mens rea.  
Strict liability does not depend on intent to harm or negligence, rather it is premised 
on the breach of an absolute duty to engage in safe activity or to make an activity 
safe.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999). 
 20 Mens rea is the state of mind that the prosecutor must prove in order to carry 
his burden of persuasion at trial.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  999 (7th ed. 1999). 
 21 The normal rules for causation do not apply to this offense.  Gerald D. Miller, 
Controlled Dangerous Substance Offenses in the Code and Schedules of Controlled Dangerous 
Substances, in 33A NJPRAC § 25.20 (3d ed. 2001).  With regard to most other criminal 
offenses, including prosecutions for sexual assault, robbery, burglary, and most types 
of murder, the New Jersey Criminal Code rules require that the prosecutor prove the 
defendant’s mental culpability in order to secure a conviction.  Essentially, the 
prosecutor must establish that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state in 
order to meet his burden of persuasion.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2 (West 2004); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1 (West 2004); 
Miller, supra, at § 25.20 (noting that strict liability crimes are a deviation from normal 
New Jersey Criminal Code crimes).  In a typical manslaughter prosecution, the mens 
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prosecutor must only prove that the defendant dispensed drugs to 
the decedent, or to a third party who dispensed drugs to the 
decedent, and that the decedent died as a result of ingesting the 
drugs.22  The statute would enable prosecutors to convict “kingpins” 
by proving only that they sold drugs to a smaller dealer, who in turn 
sold drugs to a user who overdosed and died.23  Theoretically, 
prosecutors could use this statute to secure a number of convictions 
every time a user dies from a drug overdose.24 
Despite the aforementioned legislative declarations regarding 
the intended use of 2C:35-9,25 prosecutor’s application of the statute, 
more often than not, is in direct contravention of such intent.26  In 
fact, the statute is rarely used to attack “upper echelon drug 
dealers,”27 who, according to the legislature, are the parties that 
should be targeted by this powerful statute.28  To the contrary, in the 
 
rea would be recklessness, and therefore require that the prosecutor prove that the 
defendant was aware of a substantial risk but proceed anyway.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:11-4 (West 2004).  In the context of a drug sale, this requirement would only be 
met if the drug dealer had facts within his knowledge that would create a substantial 
risk that the buyer would die as a result of ingestion.  Id.  For example, if the seller 
normally sold the buyer fifty percent heroin but on this occasion was selling him one 
hundred percent pure heroin, knowing that there was a good chance that the buyer 
would inject the same amount as he normally does, then the prosecutor could likely 
gain a conviction under a reckless manslaughter statute if the buyer was to overdose 
and die as a result of ingestion.  Id.  The New Jersey drug-induced death statute 
removes this requirement and allows the prosecutor to get a conviction just by 
proving that the defendant provided the drugs to the decedent and that the 
decedent died as a result of ingestion of the drugs, the state does not have to prove 
the defendant’s mental culpability as to causing death.  Miller, supra, at § 25.20. 
 22 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Jim Edwards, Making Friends Into Felons, N.J. LAW J., Sept. 9, 2002, at 1 (citing 
statements made by Ronald Susswein, counsel to the director of the Director of 
Criminal Justice, who stated, “it says right in the legislative history, [§ 2C:35-9] can be 
traced back to some kingpin operating in another country”). 
 25 See supra note 16  and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the 
legislative intent of the drug-induced death statute. 
 26 See State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 645 A.2d 1165 (1994); State v. Ervin, 242 
N.J. Super. 584, 577 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); State v. Cullum, 338 
N.J. Super. 458, 769 A.2d. 1091 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); State ex rel. A.J., 232 
N.J. Super. 274, 556 A.2d 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989). 
 27 In 25 out of 32 cases identified by a poll of county prosecutors, the defendants 
charged did not deal drugs “in any serious manner.”  Edwards, supra note 24, at 1. 
 28 Upon enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, the legislature 
stated, 
“[I]n order to ensure the most efficient and effective dedication of 
limited investigative, prosecutorial, judicial and correctional resources, 
it is the policy of this State to distinguish between drug offenders based 
on the seriousness of the offense, considering principally the nature, 
quality and purity of the controlled substance and the role of the actor 
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majority of cases the statute has been used to prosecute minors with 
no record or evidence of prior drug dealing,29 family members who 
engaged in drug use “recreationally,” 30 and “small time users,” whom 
the legislature expressly stated should be rehabilitated, not 
incapacitated.31 
Although the statute’s purpose was to punish dealers as killers, 
without regard to their intent,32 a closer look at application indicates 
that very few dealers have been prosecuted and/or convicted under 
the statute.33  According to one state prosecutor, “the accused is 
oftentimes the last person who wanted the decedent to die.”34  Out of 
thirty-two drug-induced death prosecutions identified and examined 
by the New Jersey Law Journal,35 twenty-five involved prosecutions of 
friends of the decedent who did not deal drugs in any significant 
manner,36 and only three involved prosecutions of actual drug 
dealers.37  These statistics indicate that almost ninety-percent of drug-
induced death prosecutions in New Jersey are in direct contravention 
of legislative intent.38 
This Comment will explore the various consequences of the New 
Jersey drug- induced death statute.  Part II of this Comment will 
examine the case law surrounding the statute and demonstrate that, 
more often than not, application of the statute is outside the realm of 
what the legislature intended.  Furthermore, this section will argue 
 
in the overall drug distribution network.  It is the intention of the 
legislature to provide for the strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of 
the most culpable and dangerous drug offenders, and to facilitate the 
rehabilitation of drug dependent persons. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
 29 See State ex rel. A.J., 232 N.J. Super. at 274, 556 A.2d  at 1283. 
 30 See Ervin, 242 N.J. Super. at 584, 577 A.2d at 1273; Cullum, 338 N.J. Super. at 
458, 769 A.2d. at 1091. 
 31 The legislative declaration states, “[i]t is the intention of the legislature to 
provide for the strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most 
culpable and dangerous drug offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug 
dependent persons.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) (emphasis added).  See 
Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 536, 645 A.2d at 1165; Ervin, 242 N.J. Super. at 584, 577 A.2d 
at 1273. 
 32 See supra note 16  and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the 
legislative intent. 
 33 Edwards, supra note 24, at 1. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id.  In the other four cases the relationship of the defendant to the decedent 
was unknown. Id. 
 38 Edwards, supra note 24, at 1.  It is not known what proportion the thirty-two 
cases examined represent of the total number of indictments. 
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that the justifications set forth for this powerful statute by both courts 
and the legislature are misplaced, as the statute accomplishes none of 
its asserted objectives.  Part III suggests alternatives to the current 
New Jersey drug-induced death statute and argues that these 
alternatives reduce the various problems associated with the current 
statute.  Finally, Part IV will conclude that 2C:35-9 has accomplished 
none of its objectives, demonstrate that the unintended 
consequences of the statute significantly outweigh any benefits 
provided by the statute, and argue that the most effective solution to 
the problems created by the statute would be for the legislature to 
expressly limit its application to “upper echelon” drug dealers and 
kingpins. 
II. APPLICATION AND CURRENT STATUS OF LIABILITY FOR 
DRUG-INDUCED DEATH IN NEW JERSEY. 
As noted above, in order to carry the burden of persuasion at 
trial and secure a conviction for drug-induced death under 2C:35-9, 
the prosecutor must only prove that the defendant dispensed drugs 
to the decedent, or to a third party who dispensed drugs to the 
decedent, and that the decedent died as a result of ingesting the 
drugs.39  The prosecutor does not have to prove any mental state on 
the part of the defendant, as liability for drug-induced death is strict, 
and therefore he can carry his burden by proving only that the guilty 
act took place.40  2C:35-9 states, in pertinent part: 
a. Any person who manufactures, distributes, or dispenses any 
controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedules I or II 
(including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, lysergic acid 
diethylamide, phencyclidine, or any analog thereof) is strictly 
liable for a death which results from the ingestion, injection, or 
inhalation of that substance and is guilty of a crime of the first 
degree. 
b. For purposes of this offense, to distribute means the transfer, 
actual or constructive, or attempted, from one person to 
another.41 
The legislative declarations regarding 2C:35-9 indicate that the 
legislature included this powerful strict liability provision as a way to 
trace liability back to the “upper echelon” drug dealers or “kingpins” 
of the organized drug trade.42  Upon enactment of the statute, the 
 
 39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004). 
 40 See supra note 19 for a discussion of the implications of a strict liability statute. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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New Jersey legislature stated, “it is the intention of the legislature to 
provide for the strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of 
the most culpable and dangerous drug offenders, and to facilitate the 
rehabilitation of drug dependent persons.” 43 
In State v. Maldonado,44 the New Jersey Supreme Court examined 
the constitutionality of 2C:35-9 for the first time.45  On May 7, 1988 
Lucy Maldonado bought heroin from a local dealer for her friend 
Larry and his brother John.46  After obtaining the drugs from a local 
dealer, Ms. Maldonado gave the drugs to Larry and John, receiving 
no profit for herself in the transaction.47  Subsequently, Larry and 
John went to another location where they injected the heroin.48  The 
next morning John found Larry lying dead on the floor, the result of 
a heroin overdose.49  Ms. Maldonado was charged and convicted of 
drug-induced death and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.50 
In upholding the conviction, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
deferred to the judgment of the legislature and found the strict 
liability portion of the statute valid, under both state and federal 
constitutions.51  The court justified the strict liability provision of the 
statute, stating, 
[a]bsolute liability for regulatory offenses traditionally finds 
justification in administrative convenience, the need to deter 
through the most effective forms of prosecution, dispensing with 
proof of intent, and imposing relatively minor punishment,52 all 
adding up to a conclusion that whatever injustice results from 
strict liability is more than counterbalanced by the benefit to the 
 
 43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004). 
 44 State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 645 A.2d 1165 (1994). 
 45 Id. at 545, 645 A.2d at 1169. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 545, 645 A.2d at 1169 
 51 Id. at 584, 645 A.2d at 1188-89.  Upon rejecting the defendant’s cruel and 
unusual punishment attack, the court set forth a three-part inquiry to be used, under 
both state and federal constitutions, in order to determine if punishment is cruel 
and unusual: 
1) Does the punishment for the crime conform with contemporary 
standards of decency? 
2) Is the punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense? 
3) Does the punishment go beyond what is necessary to accomplish any 
penological objective? 
Id. at 556- 57, 645 A.2d at 1175. 
 52 Ms. Maldonado was sentenced to 15 years in prison.  Id. at 545, 645 A.2d at 
1169. 
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public.53 
Subsequently, the court affirmed the conviction and fifteen-year 
prison sentence.54 
Perhaps the most controversial prosecution under 2C:35-9 
occurred in the case of State in the Interest of AJ.55  A.J., and his two 
friends, including the decedent, a sixteen year old female, decided 
that they would have a party one evening.56  At the request of the 
decedent, A.J. and the decedent took a train to New York City where 
A.J. purchased “angel dust” 57 for use that evening.58  Upon returning 
to Morristown, the juveniles headed to an unused train car where 
they would “smoke the dust.”59  The juveniles smoked two marijuana 
cigarettes, “rolled” by A.J., which were laced with “dust.”60  After 
smoking the second cigarette,61 the group decided to return to their 
respective homes in Morristown.62  It was at this time that A.J. and 
another juvenile noticed that the decedent was lying passed out on 
the tracks.63  A.J. and the other juvenile attempted to move the 
decedent but she “felt like a dead weight in their arms.” 64  A.J. 
attempted to move the decedent by himself, but was unable to, as he 
was “fairly messed up from smoking the dust.”65  A.J. and the other 
juvenile decided to leave the decedent on the train tracks, and they 
returned to their respective homes.66  At approximately 12:30 a.m., a 
 
 53 Id. at 550, 645 A.2d at 1171-72. 
 54 Id. at 584, 645 A.2d at 1189. 
 55 State ex rel. A.J., 232 N.J. Super. 274, 556 A.2d 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1989). 
 56 Id. at 276, 556 A.2d at 1284. 
 57 “Angel dust” or “PCP” are the slang terms for phencyclidine, a schedule II 
controlled dangerous substance.  Id. at 281, 556 A.2d at 1286.  Phencyclidine is a 
hallucinogen, which can be snorted, smoked, or injected.  National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, Info Facts, at www.nida.nih.gov/Infofax/pcp.html (last Visited March 25 
2002).  The drug gives users feelings of strength, power, and invulnerability.  Id.  At 
low to moderate doses, physiological effects include “an increased pulse rate, 
breathing rate, and blood pressure.”  Id.  At high doses, “physiological effects include 
a drop in blood pressure, breathing rate and pulse rate, nausea, vomiting, blurred 
vision, dizziness, seizures, comas, and death.”  Id. 
 58 State ex rel. A.J.,232 N.J. Super. at 277, 556 A.2d at 1285. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 278, 556 A.2d at 1285. 
 61 The facts do not indicate the quantity of drugs consumed by each juvenile.  Id. 
at 278-80, 556 A.2d at 1284-86. 
 62 Id. at 278, 556 A.2d at 1285. 
 63 Id. 
 64 State ex rel. AJ, 232 N.J. Super. at 278, 556 A.2d at 1285. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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New Jersey Transit train struck and killed the decedent.67  A.J. was 
subsequently convicted under 2C:35-9 for causing the drug-induced 
death of the decedent.68 
The appellate court sustained the superior court’s decision and 
found that A.J. knowingly or purposely distributed phencyclidine to 
the decedent, the decedent died, and distribution to the decedent 
was the cause69 of the death.70  The appellate court also agreed with 
the trial court’s determination that A.J. could not be rehabilitated by 
age nineteen71 and therefore sustained the waiver into adult court.72 
As with the Maldonado case discussed earlier, State in the Interest of 
A.J. is illustrative of the plethora of problems that the drug-induced 
death statute creates.73  In both cases, the strict liability feature of the 
New Jersey statute allowed the prosecutor to gain convictions against 
parties who would have faced little or no punishment in the absence 
of strict liability.74  Moreover, as stated earlier, the legislature has 
justified the strict liability statute in terms of its application to drug 
lords and kingpins.75 However, in both of the aforementioned cases, 
and in the majority of cases,76 the statute has been used to prosecute 
 
 67 Id. at 279, 556 A.2d at 1285. 
 68 Id. at 281, 556 A.2d at 1286-87. 
 69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9(b) (West 2004) states that the act of distribution 
was the cause of the death if, “the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of the drug was 
an antecedent but for which the death would not have occurred, and the death was 
not too remote to have just a bearing on the defendant’s liability or too 
dependant upon the conduct of another person that was unrelated to the use of 
effects of the drug.” 
 70 State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J. Super. at 290, 556 A.2d at 1292.  The court approved 
the trial court’s conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that the juvenile 
(A.J.) knowingly or purposely distributed phencyclidine to S.G. (the decedent) in 
violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-5 (West 2004), and that the juvenile’s 
distribution of the drugs to S.G. was the cause of her death within the meaning of 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9(b).  Id. at 290, 556 A.2d at 1292. 
 71 Once the state establishes the factual predicate for the waiver, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:4A-26 (West 2004) requires the juvenile, in order to overcome the waiver, to 
establish:, “the probability of his being rehabilitated prior to attaining the age of 19 
and that this probability substantially outweighs the reasons for the waiver.”  Id. 
 72 State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J. Super. at 292, 556 A.2d at 1287. 
 73 In State ex rel A.J., the drug-induced death statute was used to prosecute a 
juvenile for drug-induced death despite the fact that there was no indication that the 
juvenile was a drug dealer or delinquent in any manner.  See State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J. 
Super. at 292, 556 A.2d at 1283.  The defendant in A.J. was clearly not a “kingpin” of 
the organized drug trade and therefore his conviction creates precedent that allows 
drug-induced prosecutions which are clearly outside the realm that the New Jersey 
Legislature envisioned upon enactment of the statute.  See supra note 16 for a 
detailed discussion of the legislative history of the statute. 
 74 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
 75 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 76 See  Edwards, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that the majority of prosecutions 
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parties with no record of prior drug dealing.77   
Out of thirty-two drug-induced death prosecutions examined in 
a recent study by the New Jersey Law Journal, only three were against 
actual drug dealers.78  The other twenty-nine were against friends of 
the deceased, family members, and in some cases the people who 
sought emergency care for the decedent.79  As noted earlier, the 
legislature did not intend for prosecutors to use this powerful tool 
against drug dependent persons or even small time dealers, as was 
done in both Maldonado and State in the Interest of A.J.80 The legislature 
envisioned this statute as a way to trace liability back to the “upper 
echelon” dealers, whom, in the absence of this statute, were virtually 
untouchable.81  Despite this, a sixteen-year-old, drug addicted child, 
with no record of substantial drug dealing, was convicted under a 
statute designed to attack “drug kingpins” and will spend the next few 
decades of his life in jail82- all this in a state where “it is the intention 
of the legislature to provide for the strict punishment, deterrence, 
and incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous drug 
offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug dependant persons.”83 
The courts in both Maldonado and State in the Interest of A.J. 
attempted to justify their respective decisions by asserting that the 
deterrent effect84 of the statute on drug dealers and organizations85 
 
under § 2C:35-9 are against parties who have never dealt drugs). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 14. 
 80 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) states that § 2C:35-9 should only be 
used to prosecute upper echelon drug dealers, drug dependant persons should be 
rehabilitated, not incapacitated.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004); see also 
supra note 16.  In both State ex rel A.J. and Maldonado, the defendants were convicted 
under this statute notwithstanding the lack of direct evidence that they dealt drugs in 
any serious manner; they were obviously not drug kingpins or upper echelon 
members of the organized drug trade.  See State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J. Super. 274, 556 
A.2d 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989); see also State v. Maldonado 137 N.J. 536, 
645 A.2d 1165 (1994). 
 81 However, in State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
App. Div. 1972), the court found it possible to gain a conviction under reckless 
manslaughter for distribution of heroin to a party who subsequently dies as a result 
of injection.  Id. at 379-80, 288 A.2d at 33-34. 
 82 State ex rel A.J., 232 N.J. Super. at 274, 556 A.2d at 1283. 
 83 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1. 
 84 For a detailed look at the deterrence theory, see generally, George A. Antunes 
& A. Lee Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Implications for Criminal 
Justice Policy, 51 J. URB. L. 145 (1973). 
 85 In Maldonado, the court stated, “absolute liability for regulatory offenses 
traditionally finds justification in administrative convenience, the need to deter 
through the most effective forms of prosecution, dispensing with proof of intent, and 
imposing relatively minor punishment.”  Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 550, 645 A.2d at 
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outweighs any potential unfairness to defendants.86  The courts and 
the legislature contend that knowledge of the powerful statute and its 
harsh penalties will deter individuals from engaging in drug use and 
drug sales.87  Although this justification seems logical, in actuality the 
statute seems to have little, if any, deterrent effect on drug users or 
dealers.88  This lack of deterrence can be attributed, in large part, to 
sparse usage of the statute.  Since 1987, the statute has been used 
only five times in Essex county, the state’s most urban county, five 
times in Middlesex county, five times in Hunderton county, and only 
once in Atlantic, Hudson, and Passaic counties.89  Due to the 
extremely low number of prosecutions sought under 2C:35-9,90 it is 
reasonable to assume that drug dealers do not even know 2C:35-9 
exists.  If drug dealers are unaware of the existence of the statute, 
then the statute can have no deterrent effect on their conduct.91  
Deterrence theory is predicated on the notion that criminals weigh 
their potential gains and losses before they act.92  In this case, if drug 
dealers are unaware of the consequences of their actions, specifically 
the potential for prosecution under 2C:35-9, then that will not factor 
into their decision making process and there will be no deterrence.93  
Furthermore, even if some drug dealers know of the statute’s 
existence,94 the chances that it will be used against them are so 
 
1171-72. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 “There is nothing from which to infer that this particular drug statute [§ 2C:35-
9], in all its severity, will deter drug dealers from engaging in their unlawful 
behavior.”  Blair Talty, New Jersey’s Strict Liability for Drug-induced Deaths: The Leap From 
Drug Dealer to Murderer, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 516 n.14 (1999). 
 89 Id.  Furthermore, it is important to note that the low number of prosecutions 
sought under the statute is not attributable of an overall drop in the number of drug 
overdose deaths in New Jersey.  Drug Intelligence Center, New Jersey Drug Threat 
Assessment (May 15 2001) (noting that in 1999 there were over 144 cocaine overdoses 
that resulted in death in Newark alone), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/669/cocaine.html. 
 90 Edwards, supra note 24, at 14. 
 91 John K Cochran, et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An impact assessment of 
Oklahoma’s Return to Capital Punishment (March 25, 2002) (noting that the deterrence 
theory is predicated on the notion that criminals weigh their gains and losses before 
they act), available at http://www.justiceblind.com.  In this case, if drug dealers are 
unaware of the consequences of their actions, specifically the potential for 
prosecution under § 2C:35-9, then that will not factor into their decision making 
process and there will be no deterrence.  See id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Even in those situations where the dealer is aware of the drug-induced death 
statute there may be no deterrence.  See Edwards, supra note 24, at 14.  For example, 
in January 2001, Leonardo DiPasquale, a seventeen year-old from Hunderton 
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miniscule that any deterrent effect the statute may have is weak at 
best.95  Finally, it is hard to imagine that a person can be deterred 
from committing a crime that requires no mens rea for commission.  
Legislatures would be more successful, in achieving general 
deterrence, if the punishment was directly related to the sale of the 
drugs, which requires a mens rea element for conviction.96  
Therefore, the contention of courts and the legislature that the 
benefit of the statute to the public, through deterrence, outweighs 
any unfairness to defendants, is misplaced and inaccurate.97 
New Jersey courts have also attempted to justify the strict liability 
statute by noting that it imposes “relatively minor punishment.”98  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Maldonado stated, “absolute liability for 
regulatory offenses traditionally finds justification in administrative 
convenience, the need to deter through the most effective forms of 
prosecution, dispensing with proof of intent, and imposing relatively 
minor punishment.”99  This asserted justification is obviously flawed.  
Fifteen years imprisonment is clearly not “minor punishment.”100  
Furthermore, in State v. Cullum,101 drug-induced death was found to 
constitute a violent crime as defined by the No Early Release Act,102 
and, therefore, a person convicted must serve eighty-five percent of 
their sentence before being eligible for parole.103 
 
County, was involved in a drug transaction which resulted in the overdose death of 
one of DiPasquale’s friends.  Id.  Despite facing strict liability prosecution under  § 
2C:35-9 for the death of the teen, DiPasquale continued selling and using drugs.  Id.  
A few months later, while still facing the grand jury indictment, DiPasquale died 
from a heroin overdose.  Id. 
 95 Because the chance of prosecution for drug-induced death is so miniscule, 
based on the extremely low number of convictions sought under the statute, a drug 
dealer will not seriously consider conviction under the statute as a possibility when 
weighing his potential gains and losses from the conduct.  Therefore, there will be 
no deterrence.  See Cochran, et al., supra note 91, at 177; see also Talty, supra note 88, 
at 529. 
 96 Talty, supra note 88, at 529 n.75. 
 97 See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.  Legislatures would be more 
successful in achieving general deterrence if the punishment was directly related to 
the sale of the drugs, which requires a mens rea element for conviction.  Talty, supra 
note 88, at 529 n.75. 
 98 State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 645 A.2d 1165 (1994). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Ms. Maldonado was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Id. at 545, 645 A.2d at 
1119. 
 101 State v. Cullum, 338 N.J. Super. 458, 769 A.2d 1091 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
 102 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2 (West 2004). 
 103 NERA provides in pertinent part, “[a] court imposing a sentence of 
incarceration for a crime of the first or second degree shall fix a minimum term of 
85 percent of the sentence during which the defendant shall not be eligible for 
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It should be evident from the foregoing discussion that the New 
Jersey drug-induced death statute is flawed.104  The statute allows 
prosecutors to gain convictions against parties that the legislature 
expressly excluded from application of 2C:35-9.105  In fact, almost 
ninety-percent of the time the statute is used, it is used against parties 
other than drug dealers.  Based on this reality, the unintended 
consequences of the statute seem to outweigh any potential benefits 
the statute may have, and therefore demand a reexamination of the 
statute by the legislature.  California Superior Court Judge James 
Gray, a leader in drug law reform, summarized the problems 
associated with the New Jersey statute best.  Judge Gray stated, “laws 
such as 2C:35-9 are cleaning out the little people from this whole 
distribution mess, the ones who aren’t particularly smart, aren’t 
particularly violent, and aren’t particularly organized, leaving it for 
everyone else.”106 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO 2C:35-9 AND THE CURRENT STATE OF 
DRUG-INDUCED DEATH LIABILITY IN NEW JERSEY. 
In order to alleviate many of the problems the New Jersey drug-
induced statute creates,107 the New Jersey Legislature should look to 
similar legislation and case law currently used in other states.  Most of 
these alternatives accomplish the same objectives as the New Jersey 
statute, while not creating nearly as many problems.108  These 
alternatives include removal of the statute in its entirety,109 creating 
less harsh penalties for violation,110 restricting liability to inherently 
dangerous activities which have an immediate and direct causal 
relationship to the death,111 removal of the strict liability feature of 
the statute, and expressly limiting prosecutions under 2C:35-9 to 
those parties who meet the statutory definition of a drug kingpin.112 
 
parole if the crime is a violent crime.”  Id. 
 104 See discussion infra Part II. 
 105 See supra text accompanying notes 25-31. 
 106 Judge Gray also noted that users may be hesitant to seek help when another 
overdoses, out of fear of being prosecuted.  He stated, “are we having our children 
overdosing on drugs when their contemporaries are fearful to get medical treatment 
for them because they are afraid of the legal consequences?”  Edwards, supra note 24, 
at 1. 
 107 See infra Part II for a discussion of the various problems created by § 2C:35-9. 
 108 See infra Part III. 
 109 See infra Part III.A. 
 110 See infra Part III.B. 
 111 See infra Part III.C. 
 112 See infra Part III.D and Part III.E. 
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A. Remove the Statute in its Entirety and Prosecute Drug-Induced 
Death as Manslaughter. 
The first alternative to 2C:35-9 is removal of the drug-induced 
death statute in its entirety.113  Removal of the statute would allow 
prosecutors to achieve the same results that 2C:35-9 was intended to 
produce,114 while at the same time ensuring removal of most of the 
aforementioned problems associated with the law.115  This alternative 
would prevent prosecutors from using the statute against unintended 
parties, as was the case in Maldonado, State in the Interest of A.J.,116 and 
virtually all prosecutions under 2C:35-9.117  Furthermore, based on the 
fact that the statute is rarely used to prosecute drug dealers or drug 
kingpins118 and has a very limited deterrent effect on future 
conduct,119 the public would certainly be no worse off in the absence 
of the statute. 
Removal of the statute would also not have a significant impact 
on the prosecutions of drug dealers in the state.  There are a number 
of state statutes, also enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug 
Reform Act of 1987,120 which ensure that drug dealers in New Jersey 
receive harsh punishment for their crimes.121 Furthermore, even in 
 
 113 A number of state criminal codes do not contain a statute similar to § 2C:35-9 
and instead prosecute drug-induced death as manslaughter.  See infra notes 129-30. 
 114 A conviction under § 2C:35-9 is a first degree felony punishable by ten to 
twenty years in prison. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 2004).  A conviction 
of manslaughter is a second degree felony punishable by ten to thirty years in prison.  
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2004). 
 115 See supra Part II for a discussion of the various problems the current drug-
induced legislation creates. 
 116 The legislative history of the statute indicates that the statute was to be used 
only to target drug kingpins or  upper echelon members of the organized drug 
trade.  See supra note 16.  However, in Maldonado and State ex rel A.J. the statute was 
used to convict a minor and a drug addict, neither of whom dealt drugs in any 
serious manner. 
 117 See supra text accompanying notes 25-31. 
 118 See supra text accompanying notes 78-79. 
 119 See supra text accompanying notes 88-93. 
 120 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004). 
 121 For example, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (West 2004) imposes life 
imprisonment for a party convicted of being the leader of a narcotics trafficking 
network; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-4 (West 2004) makes it a first degree crime to 
operate or maintain a controlled dangerous substance production facility; and N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-6 (West 2004) makes it a second degree crime to employ a 
juvenile in a drug distribution network.  See Miller, supra note 21, at § 25.20.  
Furthermore, there is no merger for conviction under 2C:35-9 and distributing 
controlled dangerous substances near school property.  State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 
536, 583, 645 A.2d 1165, 1188 (1994).  There is no merger for conviction under § 
2C:35-9 and convictions for being the leader of a narcotics trafficking network, or 
maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substances facility.  N.J. STAT. 
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those situations 2C:35-9 currently covers,122 removal of the statute 
would have a limited impact on prosecutions of actual drug dealers, 
as New Jersey case law indicates that the same set of facts that give rise 
to 2C:35-9 liability may also give rise to liability for manslaughter,123 
which carries with it a presumptive sentence of ten to thirty years.124 
In State v. Thomas,125 the New Jersey Court of Appeals for 
Middlesex County found that the sale of heroin to a party who 
subsequently dies as a result of ingestion is sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case of manslaughter.126  In Thomas, the defendant sold 
three packets of heroin to the decedent, who subsequently overdosed 
and died as a result of injecting the narcotic.127  The court found that 
the act of delivering narcotics to a party who dies as a result of 
ingestion may meet the statutory definition of recklessness and 
therefore give rise to manslaughter liability.128  A number of other 
states also subscribe to this view, including both Connecticut129 and 
 
ANN. § 2:35-9(d) (West 2004).  Finally, there is a merger for conviction under § 
2C:35-9 and convictions for manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing illegal 
narcotics when they arise out of the same transaction.  Miller, supra note 21, at § 
25.20. 
 122 The drug-induced death statute applies in situations where the defendant 
distributed illegal narcotics to a party who dies as a result of ingestion of the drugs.  
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004). 
 123 See State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 
1972). 
 124 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2004). 
 125 See State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 
1972). 
 126 Id. at 379; see also State v. Ervin, 242 N.J. Super. 584, 577 A.2d 1273 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), where the court noted that a defendant who sold heroin 
to a drug user who died from an overdose could be convicted of manslaughter.  The 
court justified its position, stating 
“[the court is] satisfied that there can be imputed to defendant either 
knowledge or reckless disregard of the consequence of his act, and that 
the jury could have reasonably found from the proofs that beyond a 
reasonable doubt the regular, natural and likely consequence of the 
sale of heroin was the user’s death. 
Id. at 590, 577 A.2d at 1276. 
 127 Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. at 378, 288 A.2d at 34. 
 128 Id. at 380, 288 A.2d at 35. 
 129 See State v. Wassil, 233 Conn. 174 (1995) (holding that because the state 
manslaughter statute applies to all reckless conduct, there is no reason why the sale of 
drugs for economic gain that results in death should be summarily exempt from 
possible prosecution as manslaughter).  But see State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441 (1973) 
(finding that the act of selling heroin to a party who dies upon injection does not 
constitute second degree murder); People v. Pickney, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 416 (Cty. Ct. 
1971) (holding that a drug dealer is not guilty of homicide if the party who received 
the drugs dies as a result of ingestion); United States v Dillon, 18 M.J. 340, 16 Fed. R. 
Evid. Serv. 532 (1984) (holding that conviction for involuntary manslaughter could 
not be sustained based solely on the fact that the defendant sold the substance 
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Kentucky.130  Therefore, pursuant to Thomas, it would still be possible 
for a prosecutor to secure a homicide conviction against a drug 
dealer even in the absence of 2C:35-9.131  In fact, manslaughter 
convictions carry with them a harsher presumptive sentence than 
drug-induced death convictions.132 
Based on the aforementioned considerations, it seems that a 
viable alternative to the current state of New Jersey drug-induced 
death liability is the wholesale abandonment of 2C:35-9.  In the 
absence of 2C:35-9, prosecutors would have to proceed under case 
law, specifically State v. Thomas,133 in order to secure a manslaughter 
conviction for drug-induced death.  While this alternative would 
increase the prosecutor’s burden of persuasion at trial,134 such 
increased burden would be minimal in comparison with the decrease 
in the number of unintended drug-induced death prosecutions.135 
B. CREATE LESS HARSH PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF   
2C:35-9. 
The penalty for violation of New Jersey’s drug-induced death 
statute is harsh in comparison to the majority of other states.136  
Currently, conviction under 2C:35-9 constitutes a first degree 
 
(cocaine) to the decedent which caused his death). 
 130 See Lofthouse v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.2d 236 (Ky. 2000) (finding that the 
determination as to whether furnishing controlled dangerous substances to a party 
who dies as a result of ingestion constitutes manslaughter should be made on a case 
by case basis, after examining all relevant facts). 
 131 See supra note 127-28 and accompanying text.  Prosecutors would just have to 
proceed under case law, specifically State v. Thomas, where the Court found that the 
same set of facts that currently give rise to liability under § 2C:35-9 may also give rise 
to manslaughter liability; see also State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1972). 
 132 A conviction under 2C:35-9 is a first degree felony punishable by ten to twenty 
years in prison. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 2004).  A manslaughter 
conviction is a second degree felony punishable by ten to thirty years in prison.  N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2004). 
 133 Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. at 377, 288 A.2d at 32. 
 134 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4.  In the absence of § 2C:35-9 prosecutors would 
have to prove the defendant had the requisite mental state in order to gain a 
conviction.  See supra note 19 for a discussion of the implications of the strict liability 
feature of the statute.  With regard to manslaughter, the prosecutor must prove that 
the defendant was acting recklessly.  N.J. STAT. ANN. §  2C:11-4.  In State v. Thomas, 
the court defined recklessness as knowledge of or disregard for the consequences of 
one’s actions.  Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. at 377, 288 A.2d at 32. 
 135 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. 
 136 For a discussion on the severity of the New Jersey statute in comparison with 
similar legislation in other states, see generally Talty, supra note 88, at 513.  But see FLA. 
STAT. ANN. 782.04 (West 2004), which makes drug-induced death a capital crime. 
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felony,137 punishable by ten-to-twenty years in prison.138  Based on the 
fact that in most instances the statute is used to prosecute unintended 
parties,139 not “upper echelon” drug dealers, lessening the penalty for 
violation will serve to create a more just result in the majority of 
2C:35-9 prosecutions.140  While this alternative will not solve the major 
problems associated with the statute, specifically, its strict application 
against unintended parties,141 it will lessen the inequity experienced 
as a result of these unintended prosecutions.142  Based on the various 
other statutes often available to prosecutors under the same set of 
facts which give rise to 2C:35-9 liability,143 and because of the 
infrequency of prosecutions against actual drug kingpins,144 lessening 
the penalty for violation will have a minimal impact even on those 
prosecutions against actual drug dealers.  Furthermore, even if 
lessening the penalty for violation will result in a detriment to 
prosecutions of actual drug dealers, as they will face shorter sentences 
upon conviction, such detriment will be substantially outweighed by 
the benefit given to the unintended parties most often prosecuted 
under this statute.145 
Finally, lessening the penalty for conviction of drug-induced 
death would place New Jersey in accord with the majority of states.146  
For example, Nevada147 and Louisiana148 punish drug-induced death 
 
 137 While drug use and drug crimes certainly pose serious problems for the state 
of New Jersey, first-degree punishment is generally reserved for “the most severe and 
intolerable criminal acts.”  Talty, supra note 88, at 513 n.89. 
 138 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 2004). 
 139 See supra Part II. 
 140 If the legislature and the courts continue to allow prosecutions under § 2C:35-
9 that are clearly outside the intended scope of the statute, then reducing the penalty 
for violation is the only way to lessen the unfairness experienced by unintended 
parties most often prosecuted under the statute.  See generally Edwards, supra note 24, 
at 14. 
 141 See supra Part II for a discussion on the various problems created by § 2C:35-9. 
 142 See generally Edwards, supra note 24, at 14. 
 143 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
 144 Almost ninety percent of prosecutions under § 2C:35-9 are against parties with 
no record of drug dealing.  See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. 
 145 See supra note 143; see also notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
 146 For a discussion on the severity of the New Jersey statute in comparison to 
similar legislation in other states, see generally Talty, supra note 88, at 513. 
 147 The Nevada statute states, “If the death of a person is proximately caused by a 
controlled substance which was made available to him by another person in violation 
of this chapter, the person who made the substance available to him is guilty of 
murder.  If convicted of murder in the second degree, he is guilty of a category A 
felony.”  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.333  (Michie 2004). 
 148 The Louisiana statute states that second degree murder is committed “when 
the offender unlawfully distributes or dispenses a controlled dangerous substance 
which is the direct cause of the death of the recipient who ingested or consumed the 
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as a second degree felony, both Pennsylvania149 and Minnesota150 
punish it as a third degree felony, and Washington imposes a 
statutory maximum of ten years upon conviction.151  Therefore, while 
reducing the penalty for conviction of drug-induced death will not 
solve all of the problems currently created by the New Jersey 
legislation, it will serve to lessen the unfairness suffered by those 
unintended parties most often prosecuted under the statute. 
C. RESTRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DRUG-INDUCED 
DEATH TO SITUATIONS WHERE THERE IS A STRONG 
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACT OF 
DISPENSING THE DRUGS AND THE DEATH. 
A third alternative to the current New Jersey drug-induced death 
statute is to restrict prosecutions under the statute to those felonies 
that are inherently dangerous to human life, and only where there is 
a demonstrated causal relationship between the distribution of the 
drugs and the death.152  Nevada subscribes to this view.153 
In Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris,154 the Supreme Court of Nevada 
considered the validity of applying the second degree murder 
doctrine to a defendant who sold drugs to a party who overdosed and 
died upon ingestion.155 In Morris, the Court found that drug-induced 
death was punishable as second degree murder only in limited 
situations.156  Specifically, the court stated that drug-induced death 
constituted second degree murder only in those situations where the 
evidence indicates that the unlawful sale of drugs was inherently 
 
controlled dangerous substance.”  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West 2004). 
 149 The Pennsylvania statute states, “a person commits murder of the third degree 
who administers, dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes, sells, or distributes any 
controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance . . . and another person dies 
as a result of using the substance.”  18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 2004).  
In Commonwealth. v. Highhawk, 455 Pa. Super. 186 (1996), the court found that drug 
delivery resulting in death was not merely a sentencing provision, but a separate 
offense.  Id. at 190. 
 150 The Minnesota statute states, “Whoever, without intent to cause death, 
proximately causes the death of a human being by, directly or indirectly, distributing 
a controlled substance is guilty of murder in the third degree and may be sentenced 
to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.”  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195 (West 
2004). 
 151 In Washington, drug delivery resulting in death is a class B felony, punishable 
by up to ten years in prison.  WASH. REV. § CODE. § 69.50.415 (West 2004). 
 152 See Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983). 
 153 Id. 
 154 659 P.2d 852 (Nev. 1983). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 859. 
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dangerous to human life in the abstract,157 where there was an 
immediate158 and causal relationship between the felonious conduct 
and the death,159 and where the causal relationship extended beyond 
the mere selling of the drugs to an actual involvement in the 
ingestion of a lethal dosage by the decedent.160 
Therefore, in Nevada, in order to be convicted of second degree 
drug-induced death, the prosecutor must prove that selling the drugs 
to the decedent was inherently dangerous to human life in the 
abstract, that there was no intervention by a third party or source 
which contributed to the death, and only where the defendant was 
actually involved in the consumption of the lethal drugs by the 
decedent.161  Furthermore, the court noted that being in the presence 
of the decedent when they ingest the drugs will not, in and of itself, 
satisfy this requirement.162 
Abandonment of 2C:35-9 in favor of the approach taken to drug-
induced death prosecutions in Nevada would certainly remove many 
of the problems created by the current legislation.163  By requiring 
that the defendant actually aid the decedent in his ingestion of the 
lethal dose of drugs, the Nevada approach ensures that prosecutions 
for drug-induced death are limited to those situations where the 
defendant did more than just procure the drugs for the decedent, as 
conviction requires that the defendant be an active participant or 
contributor to the demise of the decedent. 164 
Critics would argue that adoption of this approach in New Jersey 
would defeat the whole purpose of the statute, which was to trace 
liability for drug-induced deaths up the ladder to kingpins, regardless 
 
 157 Id. When making the determination as to whether a felony is inherently 
dangerous to human life in the abstract, the court will not look at the specific victim, 
the court will look at the least dangerous way to commit the felony and ask whether it 
is inherently dangerous to human life.  Id.  Furthermore, the court refused to find 
that unlawful distribution of drugs constitutes a felony inherently dangerous to 
human life in all situations, instead leaving that determination up to the legislature.  
Id; see also People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615 (1989) (noting that before applying the 
felony murder doctrine the court must determine if the predicate felony is 
inherently dangerous to human life in the abstract).  Id. at 616. 
 158 The court defined immediate as, “without intervention from another source or 
agency.”  Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. The court stated, “absent more, the rule would not apply to a situation 
involving a sale ingested in the defendant’s presence.” Id. 
 163 See supra Part II for a discussion of the various problems the New Jersey statute 
creates. 
 164 See supra text accompanying note 160. 
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of whether or not they were directly involved in the drug 
transaction.165  However, based on the fact that 2C:35-9 is rarely used 
in its intended capacity-against drug kingpins-166 adoption of the 
Nevada approach would do no more than ensure that prosecutions 
for drug-induced death in New Jersey are limited to those situations 
where the defendant actually aided the decedent in his ingestion of 
the lethal dose of drugs.167  Under this approach, the all too often 
repeated fact pattern, a group of friends buy drugs, share them, one 
of the parties overdoses and dies and the others are charged with 
drug-induced death,168 would not lead to an unjust conviction under 
2C:35-9,169 as it currently does.170  Therefore, while adoption of this 
approach would serve to completely obliterate the ability of 
prosecutors to convict drug kingpins under 2C:35-9,171 based on the 
fact that prosecutors rarely attempt to convict drug kingpins under 
the statute,172 abandoning it in favor of the Nevada approach would 
ensure that future prosecutions for drug-induced death in New Jersey 
 
 165 Because Nevada requires that the defendant be an active participant in 
administering the lethal dose, it is virtually impossible to gain a conviction against a 
drug kingpin, who likely has no interaction with his buyers.  See supra note 19.  Upon 
enacting the drug-induced death statute, the New Jersey legislature declared it the 
public policy of the state that 
in particular our criminal laws must target for expedited prosecution 
and enhanced punishment those repeat drug offenders and upper 
echelon members of organized narcotics trafficking networks who pose 
the greatest danger to society. In order to ensure the most efficient and 
effective dedication of limited investigative, prosecutorial, judicial and 
correctional resources, it is the policy of this State to distinguish 
between drug offenders based on the seriousness of the offense, 
considering principally the nature, quality and purity of the controlled 
substance and the role of the actor in the overall drug distribution 
network. It is the intention of the legislature to provide for the strict 
punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous 
drug offenders, and to facilitate the rehabilitation of drug dependent persons. 
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1 (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
 166 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
 167 In Morris, in order to be convicted of drug-induced death, the court required 
that the defendant be involved in the ingestion, through omission or commission, of 
the lethal dose of the drugs. 659 P.2d 852, 859 (Nev. 1983). 
 168 Edwards, supra note 24, at 14.  This was the fact scenario in Maldonado, State in 
the Interest of A.J. and most other cases prosecuted under 2C:35-9.  See infra Part II. 
 169 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Of course, if one of the parties was 
to aid the decedent in administering the lethal dose then that party would be liable 
for drug-induced death, even in Nevada. Id. 
 170 See Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 536, 645 A.2d at 1165; Ervin, 242 N.J.Super. at 584, 
577 A.2d at 1273; Cullum, 338 N.J. Super. at 458, 769 A.2d. at 1091; State ex rel A.J., 
232 N.J. Super. at 274, 556 A.2d at 1283. 
 171 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 172 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
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are reserved to those parties who contributed to the death,173 not 
merely observers and addicts who are currently favorite targets of 
prosecutors.174 
D. INCLUDE A MENS REA REQUIRMENT IN 2C:35-9 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the strict liability 
feature of 2C:35-9 creates a number of problems.175  Specifically, 
because the prosecutor can gain a conviction without establishing any 
mental state,176 the burden of persuasion is significantly reduced.  The 
prosecutor need only prove that the defendant gave drugs to the 
decedent in order to carry his trial burden.177  This feature was 
included in the New Jersey statute as a way to trace liability for drug-
induced death back to the upper echelon drug dealers, despite their 
lack of knowledge of the transaction.178  The Legislature envisioned 
this statute as a powerful weapon against the growing number of drug 
gangs in New Jersey,179 but in actuality, the far majority of 
prosecutions have been against every party except the drug dealer 
involved in the transaction.180  These unintended prosecutions would 
be very difficult, if not impossible, to attain if the prosecutor had to 
prove mens rea.181 
i. Recklessness 
Requiring the prosecutor to prove reckless conduct182 on the 
 
 173 See supra note 167. 
 174 See Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 536, 645 A.2d at 1165; Ervin, 242 N.J.Super. at 584, 
577 A.2d at 1273; Cullum, 338 N.J. Super. at 458, 769 A.2d. at 1091; State ex rel A.J., 
232 N.J. Super. at 274, 556 A.2d at 1283; see also Edwards, supra note 24, at 14. 
 175 See infra Part II for a discussion of the various problems created by § 2C:35-9. 
 176 See supra note 19. 
 177 The strict liability feature of the New Jersey statute allows the prosecutor to 
carry the burden of persuasion and gain a conviction without proving mens rea.  See 
supra notes 19-21 for a more detailed discussion. 
 178 See supra note 21; see also Edwards, supra note 24, at 14. (stating, “the purpose 
of [§ 2C:35-9] was to hold dealers responsible for the danger they create by 
punishing them as killers without regard to intent”). 
 179 Id.; see also NBC News.com, Gangs Take Root in the Garden State (November 7, 
2002) (noting that the increase of violent crimes in New Jersey is directly correlated 
with the “super-gangs” that have followed the drug trade east), available at 
http://www.wnbc.com/news/1771216/detail.html. 
 180 Edwards, supra note 24, at 14 (noting that the majority of prosecutions for 
drug-induced death are against friends of the decedent, other drug addicts, and 
parties who sought assistance for the decedent). 
 181 Miller, supra note 21, at § 25.20.  Under non-strict liability statutes the 
prosecutor must establish that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state in 
order to meet his burden of persuasion.  Id. 
 182 Inclusion of a recklessness requirement in 2C:35-9 would be virtually identical 
  
2004 COMMENT 1349 
part of the defendant in order to gain a conviction under 2C:35-9 
would significantly reduce the number of unintended drug-induced 
death prosecutions.183  If this approach was taken in New Jersey, the 
prosecutor would have to show, in order to meet his burden at trial, 
that the defendant had facts within his knowledge that created a 
substantial risk that his conduct would result in the death of another 
party.184  This approach would make it virtually impossible to attack 
drug kingpins for drug-induced death,185 instead reserving 
prosecution for only the most culpable parties, those who knew of the 
danger but proceeded anyway.186 
ii. Knowledge 
The inclusion of a knowledge requirement under 2C:35-9 would 
also ensure that only the most culpable parties, those with actual 
knowledge of the dangerousness of their actions, would be convicted 
of drug-induced death.187  Although inclusion of a knowledge 
requirement would prevent many of the problems created by the 
current statute, as 2C:35-9 would only apply to the most responsible 
parties,188 the adoption of a knowledge requirement would be an 
extreme action for the New Jersey Legislature, as the prosecutor 
would carry a very difficult burden for all convictions under 2C:35-
9.189 
 
to removing the statute in its entirety and proceeding under manslaughter.  See infra 
Part III.A.  However, there is limited authority for prosecutors to rely on with regard 
to prosecuting drug-induced death as manslaughter.  See State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. 
Super. 377, 288 A.2d 32 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1972).  Therefore inclusion of a 
recklessness requirement by the legislature would create binding authority which 
would allow prosecutors to proceed under a recklessness standard. 
 183 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
 184 In Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. at 377, 288 A.2d at 32, the court defined 
recklessness as knowledge of or disregard for the consequences of one’s actions.  Id. 
at 380, 288 A.2d at 34. 
 185 Under non-strict liability statutes the prosecutor must establish that the 
defendant acted with the requisite mental state in order to meet his burden of 
persuasion.  See supra note 19.  Based on the fact that drug kingpins likely have little, 
if any, interaction with their buyers, it would be nearly impossible for the prosecutor 
to establish recklessness, knowledge, or negligence.  See supra notes 19-21. 
 186 For an example of a state that has a recklessness requirement, see 
Commonwealth. v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779 (1990); Commonwealth. v. Auditor, 407 
Mass. 793 (1990). 
 187 The Model Penal Code states that a person acts knowingly if he is aware, with 
practical certainty, that his conduct will cause a certain result.  MODEL PENAL 
CODE       § 2.02. 
 188 Id. 
 189 In order to secure a conviction the prosecutor must prove that the defendant 
was practically certain that his conduct would cause a particular result. Id. 
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E. Expressly Restrict Prosecutions Under 2C:35-9 to Drug Kingpins or 
Leaders of Narcotic Trafficking Networks. 
The final alternative to the current statute would be for the New 
Jersey Legislature to expressly limit application of 2C:35-9 to drug 
kingpins.  The New Jersey Legislature stated in 2C:35-9’s legislative 
history that use of the drug-induced death statute should be reserved 
only for prosecution of the most culpable drug dealers, “those that 
pose the greatest danger to society.”190  However, the legislature did 
not specifically limit application of the statute to such parties in the 
statutory language,191 instead declaring such intention only in the 
legislative history.192  Critics will argue that the omission was 
intentional, that the legislature never intended the statute to apply 
only to “upper echelon” drug dealers or kingpins.193  While this 
argument may be valid, it is hard to imagine why the legislature 
would have included a detailed legislative statement pronouncing it 
the policy of the state to rehabilitate drug dependant persons,194 not 
incarcerate them,195 and then enact a statute that not only 
incarcerates them, but also makes them ineligible for drug 
rehabilitation programs upon conviction.196  However, even assuming 
that the omission was intentional, based on the current state of 
prosecutions under 2C:35-9 and the fact that drug dependant 
persons, whom the legislature expressly sought to protect,197 are by far 
the most frequently prosecuted parties under 2C:35-9,198 the statute 
certainly needs to be reconsidered. 
Expressly limiting application of the statute to the most 
dangerous drug dealers, as is done in a number of other New Jersey 
state statutes,199 would be the most effective solution to the plethora 
of problems created by the current statute.200 The legislature could 
expressly limit prosecutions to drug kingpins, defined as “individuals 
who conspire with at least two other persons in a scheme or course of 
 
 190 See supra note 16. 
 191 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2004). 
 192 See supra note 28. 
 193 Edwards, supra note 24, at 14. 
 194 See supra note 16. 
 195 Id. 
 196 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-14 (West 2004). 
 197 See supra note 16. 
 198 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. 
 199 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (stating, “a  person is a leader of a narcotics 
trafficking network if he conspires with two or more other persons in a scheme or 
course of conduct to unlawfully manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into or 
transport in this State [illegal narcotics]”). 
 200 See supra Part II for a discussion on the various problems created by the statute. 
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conduct to unlawfully manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into or 
transport in this State illegal narcotics.”201  This alternative would give 
prosecutors the power to protect citizens, by allowing them to 
prosecute drug kingpins.  At the same time, it would limit the power 
of prosecutors to unfairly prosecute low-level dealers and drug 
dependant persons, parties who, according to the legislature, should 
be rehabilitated, not punished.202 
IV CONCLUSION 
The majority of prosecutions for drug-induced death in New 
Jersey are in direct contravention of legislative intent and therefore 
result in inequitable and unfair consequences.203  2C:35-9 was 
envisioned by the New Jersey legislature as a way to attack the drug 
trade in New Jersey, a way for prosecutors to hold drug kingpins 
responsible for deaths that result from their indirect actions.204  In 
theory, the aforementioned justification is both an attainable goal 
and one that is in the best interest of New Jersey citizens.205  However, 
in actuality, due to inconsistent, infrequent and contradictory 
application, 2C:35-9 achieves none of its objectives.206 
The most viable alternative to the current statute would be for 
the legislature to expressly restrict prosecution under 2C:35-9 to 
upper echelon drug dealers or kingpins,207 defined in the New Jersey 
criminal code as “individuals who conspire with at least two or more 
other persons in a scheme or course of conduct to unlawfully 
manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into or transport illegal 
narcotics.”208  This alternative would give prosecutors the power to 
attack upper level drug dealers, in accordance with the original 
intent of the statute.  At the same time, this alternative would 
significantly reduce the number of unintended prosecutions under 
 
 201 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (West 2004). 
 202 See supra note 28. 
 203 See supra Part II. 
 204 See supra note 16; see also Edwards, supra note 24, at 1-14; Blair Talty, New 
Jersey’s Strict Liability for Drug-induced Deaths: The Leap From Drug Dealer to Murderer, 30 
RUTGERS L.J. 513 (1999). 
 205 The incapacitation of drug dealers is in the best interests of society because the 
offender is incapable, for the time he is incarcerated, from offending again. 
RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN GARDNER, CRIMES and PUNISHMENT: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 298 (2d ed. 1996). 
 206 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text; see also Edwards, supra note 24, 
at 14 (noting that eight prosecutors interviewed acknowledge that § 2C:35-9 is not as 
useful against dealers as the public had hoped). 
 207 See supra Part III.E. 
 208 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (West 2004). 
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the statute, as low level drug dealers and users would  not meet the 
statutory definition of drug kingpin.209 
Present application of 2C:35-9 has no significant impact on the 
New Jersey drug trade, has no deterrent effect on future criminal 
conduct,210 and more often than not is used to prosecute unintended 
parties, most notably drug addicts,211 whom the legislature expressly 
sought to protect from the statute.212  Based on these realities, it 
seems that the unintended and negative consequences of the statute 
outweigh the positive ones.  As such, the statute needs to be 
reconsidered by the New Jersey legislature. 
 
 
 
 209 Id.; see also text accompanying notes 204-05. 
 210 See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text. 
 211 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 212 See supra note 16. 
